Kadizadelis, Nakşbendis, and Intra-Sufi Diatribe in Seventeenth-Century Istanbul[1]

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For Istanbulites, the mid-seventeenth century was a time of intense rhetoric and violent confrontations issuing from some of the capital's premier mosques. What came to be known as the Kadızadeli affair had its origins some two decades earlier, with the appointment of Kadızade Mehmed Efendi as the Friday preacher (*va'iz*) in a series of imperial mosques; he was ultimately appointed to Aya Sofya in 1041/1632. Addressing the mosque-going urban population directly from their pulpits, Kadızade Mehmed and later a group of fellow imperial mosque preachers dubbed Kadızadelis (followers of Kadızade) mounted a campaign of literalist and puritanical reformism whose target was all manner of religious innovation (*bid'a*), and especially those innovations associated with Sufis and their devotional practice.[2] Of all the rituals, beliefs, and social practices that they attacked, none was denounced more insistently than visits to saints' tombs in search of intercession and the use of music and dance in the Sufi ritual. Other objects of their ire included performing supererogatory prayers in congregation, the belief in the paradigmatic mystical guide Hızır, holding intercommunal prayers in time of crisis, consuming coffee and tobacco, and bowing before social superiors.

1. For the sake of consistency in transliteration, I dispense with most diacritical marks and use Nakşbendi/Nakşbendiye and other Ottoman-Turkish forms throughout, even in non-Ottoman contexts.

2. For modern studies, see Madeline Zilfi, "The Kadızadelis: Discordant Revivalism in Seventeenth-Century Istanbul," *Journal of Near Eastern Studies* 45, no. 4 (1986): 251–69; idem, *The Politics of Piety: The Ottoman Ulema in the Post-Classical Age (1600–1800)* (Minneapolis, 1988), chapters 4–5; Semiramis Çavuşoğlu, "The Kādīzādeli Movement: An Attempt of *Şerī'at*-Minded Reform in the Ottoman Empire" (Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1990). Along with these, I have relied on two contemporary or near-contemporary accounts: Mustafa Na'ima, *Tarih-i Na'ima*, 3rd ed., 6 vols. (Istanbul, 1281–83/1864–66), 5:54–59, 267–73, 6:227–41, and Katib Çelebi, *Mizan ül-hakk fi ihtiyar il-ahakk* (Istanbul, 1286/1869–70), also translated as *The Balance of Truth*, trans. G. L. Lewis (London, 1957). For an account of a related incident in early eighteenth-century Cairo, see R. Peters, "The Battered Dervishes of Bab Zuwayla: A Religious Riot in Eighteenth-Century Cairo," in *Eighteenth-Century Renewal and Reform in Islam*, ed. Nehemia Levtzion and John O. Voll (Syracuse, N.Y., 1987), 93–115.

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Harshly denounced, too, was the practice of seeking insight in the teachings of the twelfth-century mystic Muhyi al-Din Ibn al-ʿArabi (d. 543/1148), and especially in the doctrine of the "Unity of Being" (*vahdet-i vücud*), the set of ideas about God's immanence that came to be associated with him.[3] All these practices would have to be uprooted in the name of a narrow and militant orthodoxy inspired by the teachings of the puritanical scholar Birgili Mehmed (d. 981/1573) in whom, posthumously, the Kadızadelis found their principal intellectual mentor.[4]

Sufis bore the brunt of the movement's criticism and violence, as they had many times before throughout Islamic history when militant guardians of orthodoxy set out to excite the public and to woo popular support. In the Kadızadeli affair specifically, as Madeline Zilfi has shown, the issue was not simply concern over religious accretionism, but also protest over social standing and professional opportunities. Mosque preachers belonged "by selectivity, education, compensation, and career expectations" to the periphery of the *ilmiye*, the Ottoman religious hierarchy. Many of them came from the provinces and were less rigorously educated than the ulema proper, products of the capital's graded system of theological-legal colleges (*medreses*). Their recruitment and promotions were not decided by seniority, but rather depended on preachers' ability to "hold a crowd," along with the terms set by founders of pious endowments (*evkaf*). In these circumstances, would-be preachers frequently competed for appointments with Sufi sheikhs.[5] Preacher positions at the most lucrative imperial mosques—such that the Kadızadeli leaders themselves might hold—were a matter for the decision of the sultan (or his grand vizier) and the empire's chief jurisconsult (*şeyhülislam*); and here, too, Sufi sheikhs, especially Halvetis, often emerged as the favorites.[6] All this was no doubt one reason that the Kadızadelis put

3. Both admirers and opponents have commonly taken Ibn al-ʿArabi to be the founder of this doctrine. William Chittick argues, however, that he did not elaborate anything close to a doctrine, nor used the term *waḥdat al-wujud* in his writings. The notion of *waḥdat al-wujud* as a specific doctrine, the fierce debate surrounding it, and the belief that Ibn al-ʿArabi was the founder all originated two and more centuries after his death. See William Chittick, "Waḥdat al-Shuhūd," *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd ed. (henceforth *EI²*).

4. On Birgili, see Ata'ullah Nevʿizade Ata'i, *Hada'ik ül-haka'ik fi tekmilet işşaka'ik*, 2 vols. with consecutive pagination (Istanbul, 1268/1852), 179–81; Katib Çelebi, *Mizan ül-hakk*, 115–20; Mehmed Süreyya, *Sicill-i osmani*, 4 vols. (Istanbul, 1308–5/1890–97), 4:121; Kasım Kufrevî [Kufralı], "Birgewi," *EI²*.

5. Zilfi, *Politics of Piety*, 163–67; idem, "Kadızadelis," 265–68 (quotation from p. 266).

6. Zilfi's data show that of forty-eight appointments (representing twenty-eight individual appointees) made to the five greatest mosques of the capital, Aya Sofya, Sultan Ahmed, Süleymaniye, Bayezid, and Fatih, between 1621 and

Halvetis (and to a lesser extent Mevlevis, Celvetis, and other Sufis) at the center of their campaign of puritanism and anti-elitism.

Much criticism was reserved for members of the *ilmiye* hierarchy itself. To be sure, the Kadızadeli leaders were keenly aware of the importance of mobilizing the coercive power of the state and the support of senior men of religion. But towards the latter they were ambivalent. As they saw it, part of the problem was that these very guardians of the Holy Law consorted with Sufi sheikhs and tolerated and even condoned a host of *bid'a*s, including the performing of suspect Sufi rituals in public mosques.

It was by their militant interpretation and implementation of the age-old Islamic obligation of "commanding right and forbidding wrong" (*emr-i ma'ruf ve nehy-i münker*) that the Kadızadelis particularly distinguished themselves.[7] They were not content to denounce certain practices from their pulpits and to warn listeners not to engage in them. What they sought was to provoke the public and ultimately the Ottoman political authorities into action; with this in mind they called on their listeners to engage in acts of vigilantism and pronounced anybody who shunned such participation no better than the perpetrators of the reprehensible acts themselves. On several occasions they inspired followers from the wider mosque-going urban population and the guardsmen of the Palace Service to mount physical assaults on Sufi sheikhs and lodges (*tekke*s). Especially noteworthy was the incident in 1061/1651 in which, having secured the sanction of the Grand Vizier Melek Ahmed Paşa, the Kadızadeli preachers sent off zealous followers who destroyed the Halveti *tekke* near Demir Kapı.

Given this picture of puritanical preachers and their popular following berating and harrassing Sufi sheikhs and practitioners, what are we to make of the fact that some of the Kadızadeli leaders themselves had Sufi connections, or of a Kadızadeli preacher who was himself an active Sufi sheikh and *tekke* incumbent? In his account of the year of the Demir Kapı incident, the historian Na'ima introduces the Kadızadeli leader Mehmed Üstüvani and a group of mosque preacher-collaborators around whom gathered the corps of vigilantes who took to attacking *tekke*s and their visitors. One of these preachers was Çelebi Şeyh, whose recently deceased father, Mehmed, then brother, Ahmed, were successively the incumbents of the Halveti Erdebili Tekke near Aya Sofya.[8] A second Üstüvani collaborator was a sheikh by the

1685, nineteen (representing twelve individuals) were of Halvetis, and another four (representing three individuals), of Celvetis. See Zilfi, *Politics of Piety*, 180–81 (notes 130 and 131) and appendix, 255–56.

7. On the elaboration of this doctrine throughout the Islamic tradition, see Michael Cook, *Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought* (Cambridge, 2000). The Kadızadeli interpretation is taken up on pp. 323–30.

8. Na'ima, 5:55. Ahmed (d. 1080/1670) served concurrently as the Friday

name Osman, described here as the "teacher of the pages in the Palace and preacher of the Süleymaniye Mosque,"[9] but otherwise recognizable as a prominent Istanbul Sufi sheikh and *tekke* incumbent.

A Bosnian by birth, Osman Bosnevi (d. 1074/1664) had come to the capital some three decades before the incident described by Na'ima. He was initiated into the Nakşbendi Sufi brotherhood (*tarikat*) by Ahmed Tirevi, the veteran sheikh of the Hekim Çelebi Tekke in Fil Damı near Aksaray, which Sultan Süleyman had built and endowed for the eponym a century earlier. Within a few years, he was authorized as a Nakşbendi sheikh in Tirevi's spiritual line, then succeeded his master as *tekke* incumbent. At the same time he embarked on the career path of an imperial mosque preacher: in 1031/1621–2 he was appointed to the Fatih Mosque, in 1045/1635–6 to Sultan Bayezid, in 1052/1642–3 to Süleymaniye, and in 1061/1651, to Aya Sofya.[10]

Bosnevi's involvement with the Kadızadelis may have been short. Na'ima does not mention him in his account of later Kadızadeli-related incidents, nor in the description of the banishment of Üstüvani and his associates from Istanbul following the appointment of Köprülü Mehmed as grand vizier in 1065/1656.[11] Perhaps he was moved to curb his rhetoric or to distance himself from the other Kadızadeli preachers following the admonition of the *şeyhülislam*, Baha'i Efendi, who at some point summoned Üstüvani's preacher-collaborators to appear before him "one by one" and apparently warned them that their incendiary rhetoric was unacceptable.[12] Still, even a short involvement of this Sufi sheikh and *tekke* incumbent in a campaign filled with such vituperative anti-Sufi rhetoric and such militant approach to "forbidding wrong" would have been remarkable. What we have here is an outright insider who did much more than criticize some aspects of Sufism in

preacher at Fatih, then Süleymaniye and Aya Sofya. See Şeyhi Mehmed Efendi, *Vekayi'ü'l-fuzala'*, vols. 3–4 of *Şaka'ik-i nu'maniye ve-zeyilleri*, ed. Abdülkadir Özcan (Istanbul, 1989), 3:566–67; Zâkir Şükrî Efendi, *Die Istanbuler Derwisch-Konvente und ihre Scheiche (Mecmu'a-ı tekaya)*, ed. Klaus Kreiser from a typescript of Mehmet Serhan Tayşı (Freiburg, 1980), 58.

9. Na'ima, 5:55.

10. On Bosnevi's career, see Şeyhi, 3:560; Uşakizade İbrahim Hasib Efendi, *Zeyl-i şaka'ik*, ed. in facsimile Hans Joachim Kissling (Wiesbaden, 1965), 551. On the Hekim Çelebi Tekke and the Nakşbendi circle associated with it, see Nev'izade Ata'i, 216; Hafiz Hüseyn Ayvansarayı, *Hadikat ül-cevami'*, 2 vols. (Istanbul, 1281/1864–5), 1:89–90; Dina Le Gall, *A Culture of Sufism: Naqshbandīs in the Ottoman World, 1450-1700* (Albany, N.Y., 2005), 42, 50, 57, 59.

11. On these incidents, see Na'ima, 5:54–59, 267–73, 6:227–41. Bosnevi clearly was not exiled from Istanbul with Üstüvani. He continued to serve as both *tekke* incumbent and mosque preacher at Aya Sofya until his death (see Uşakizade, 551; Ayvansarayı, 1:90).

12. Na'ima, 5:58.

writing or in academic debates, as numerous Sufi masters had done before. Bosnevi both took the fight to the public and participated in an anti-Sufi campaign that turned manifestly violent, and this in a society that was permeated by Sufi institutions, discourse, and practice, and in which Sufis and ulema were far from being aligned neatly against each other. Many of the capital's ulema associated with Sufi masters: they would frequent their lodges, attend their sessions of poetry reading, or receive instruction from them in subjects such as calligraphy [13] Nor were the ulema necessarily sympathetic to the Kadızadeli discourse or constituency. In voicing the militant Kadızadeli rhetoric from the pulpit of the Süleymaniye Mosque, Bosnevi thus ran the risk of alienating powerful ulema as well as fellow Sufis.

Questions naturally arise as to how this Sufi sheikh and *tekke* incumbent became involved with a campaign of this kind, and how this role of his reflects on criticism of Sufism from within (and on the Kadızadeli leadership). Was the case of the Nakşbendi-Kadızadeli Bosnevi an aberration? Do we know of other instances of such harsh criticism of Sufism originating from within Sufi, and more specifically Nakşbendi, ranks? Was Bosnevi perhaps prone to this kind of anti-Sufi activism precisely because he was a sheikh of a brotherhood that is so often associated with militant commitment to enforcing Islamic orthodoxy? Is his involvement with the Kadızadeli campaign to be understood in the context of specific seventeenth-century Ottoman political tensions or rivalries? Was it an internal rift within Ottoman Sufism that drove this Sufi sheikh to incite the public against fellow Sufis?

Critics from Within

Criticism of Sufism from within, even in its harsher manifestations, was neither new nor unusual. The Damascene Hanbali jurist and theologian Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328), arguably history's most famous crusader against *bid'a*, was an opponent of antinomian sheikhs, visits to saints' tombs, and teaching Ibn al-ʿArabi. Yet he was himself affiliated with a number of Sufi brotherhoods and was especially proud of having worn the Qadiri cloak (Ar. *khirqa*, the cloak marking initiation into a Sufi path), which in time he bestowed on his student Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya. He was also well versed in Sufi literature and admitted to having read the *Al-Futuhat al-makkiyya* of Ibn al-ʿArabi in his youth.[14]

13. Zilfi, *Politics of Piety*, 170. However, those at the highest echelons of the ulema hierarchy, especially *şeyhülislams*, were by dint of their office and responsibilities more pragmatic, more attentive to the political implications of their judgments, and more disposed to balancing the demands of different constituencies (see Zilfi, "Kadızadelis," 259–60).

14. H. Laoust, "Ibn Taymiyya," *EI*²; George Makdisi, "Ibn Taymīya: A Sufi of the Qādirīya Order," *American Journal of Arabic Studies* 1 (1973): 123f.; idem, "The

From roughly the same period of Ibn Taymiyya, with its impulse of reforming Islam and the Muslim community in the wake of the upheavals brought about by the Mongol invasion, we know of a group of critics of Sufism from within who emerged out of the Khwajagani or proto-Nakşbendi tradition of Transoxania. The ʿAbd al-Khaliqiyan, as they were known, did not countenance anti-Sufi violence. But in the context of rivalries over disciples and modes of recruitment, they chose to dissociate themselves from some fellow Sufis by using the harsh rhetoric of outside critics. Devin DeWeese has shown that the target was principally Yasavi and Kubravi sheikhs. The ʿAbd al-Khaliqiyan took exception to these sheikhs' overly compromising approach to communal affiliation (and hence Islamization), which they believed was manifested in their willingness to extend external symbols of Sufi piety and affiliation to groups insufficiently attuned to observance of Islamic law. For this laxity, they denounced these sheikhs as "fraudulent" and described them as agents of "corrupt Sufism."[15]

Two other examples of harsh critics of Sufism from within come from Bosnevi's own time. Nur al-Din Raniri (d. 1068/1658) was a Sufi and scholar, a prolific writer, and an adept of the Qadiriyya, Rifaʿiyya, and ʿAydarusiyya born in Gujarat; in time he settled in Aceh in northern Sumatra, where he became the highest-ranking man of religion of the sultanate under Sultan Iskandar II. In Aceh, Raniri distinguished himself as an advocate of a militantly orthodox Islam and in particular a harsh critic of the followers of two recently deceased local scholars and Sufis, Hamza al-Fansuri and Shams al-Din al-Sumatrani. He accused Fansuri and Sumatrani of corrupting local Islam by having popularized a polytheistic and heretical interpretation of the doctrine of the "Unity of Being." For a number of years, he presided over a series of fierce debates at court, during which the sultan called upon followers of the accused Sufi masters to repent before God for their unbelief, then had them killed and their books burnt. Then Raniri himself fell from grace. In 1054/1644 he was banished from Aceh, and was ironically replaced in court by one of those Fansuri and Sumatrani's followers whom he had once accused of holding unorthodox views.[16]

In Gujarat, at about the same time, the Shattari sheikh Burhan al-Din Razi Ilahi (d. 1083/1673) took issue with practices that had become prevalent in India, such as dancing and the performance of flute music in the context

Hanbali School and Sufism," *Humaniora Islamica* 2 (1974): 67–69.

15. Devin DeWeese, "Khojāganī Origins and the Critique of Sufism: The Rhetoric of Communal Uniqueness in the *Manāqib* of Khoja ʿAlī ʿAzīzān Rāmitānī," in *Islamic Mysticism Contested: Thirteen Centuries of Controversies and Polemics*, ed. Frederick de Jong and Bernd Radtke (Leiden, 1999), 492–519.

16. Azyumardi Azra, "Opposition to Sufism in the East Indies in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," in *Islamic Mysticism Contested*, 672–77.

of the Sufi ritual. Moreover, when a number of his disciples went into an ecstatic state and chanted "Burhan is God most Great," the sheikh became so dismayed that he turned them over to the judge, who sentenced them to death. In Carl Ernst's view, this was a delayed response to an earlier instance of persecution in which the Shattari master Muhammad Ghawth (d. 970/1563) had been censored repeatedly for extravagant ecstatic utterances, including one in which he described an ascension to heaven reminiscent of the famous ascension (Ar. *miʿraj*) story of Abu Yazid Bastami. In the century after Muhammad Ghawth, Indian sheikhs of the Shattariyya internalized the impact of his persecution and adopted an approach of greater conservatism and attentiveness to Islamic law. In the case of Razi Ilahi, the result was that he responded to the potentially scandalous proclamation of his own disciples with immediate and harsh censorship.[17]

One could go on eliciting examples of harsh criticism of Sufis and Sufism coming from within Sufi ranks—and not only from casual or fleeting devotees. Over the centuries, more than a few Sufi leaders and groups were driven to censure fellow Sufis, and some clearly moved beyond academic polemics to encourage the imposition of harsh measures or to unleash violence against the targets of their accusations. It was not uncommon for such critics from within to use language and arguments that they appropriated from more strident outside opponents. They might frame their attacks as ones against the "corruption" of the Sufi creed or devotional regimen, not against Sufism as such. Yet the issues were similar to those that outside opponents of Sufism commonly targeted: studying Ibn al-ʿArabi, making ecstatic utterances about God, visiting tombs, or incorporating music and dance in the Sufi ritual. The context, to be sure, was almost always one with a political angle to it. Sometimes the underlying issue was standing with or seeking to gain the patronage of political authorities. At other times it might be competition among spiritual leaders and their respective Sufi styles. At still others, inside critics were seeking to preempt the potentially devastating attacks of outside opponents by appropriating and recasting them as internal calls for reform.

Among the Kadızadeli leadership itself there were others with Sufi connections apart from Osman Bosnevi. Both the eponym, Kadızade Mehmed Efendi, and his intellectual mentor, Birgili, were insiders of sorts who had received guidance from Sufi sheikhs—one Bayrami, the other Halveti—early in their careers, before they embarked on the puritanical campaigns for which they are best known.[18] As we have seen, one of Üstüvani's preacher-

17. Carl W. Ernst, "Persecution and Circumspection in Shattari Sufism," in *Islamic Mysticism Contested*, 416–35.

18. On Kadızade Mehmed, see Katib Çelebi, *Mizan ül-hakk*, 121. On Birgili,

collaborators during the second wave of Kadızadeli militancy in the early 1060s/1650s, Çelebi Şeyh, was the son and brother of prominent Halveti sheikhs and *tekke* incumbents. But even in such company, the veteran Sufi sheikh and *tekke* incumbent Bosnevi doubling as one of the public faces of this strident and violent anti-Sufi campaign remains striking. It is thus around him that the following discussion is centered.

Bosnevi and the Paradigm of Nakşbendi Orthodoxy

One way to try to make sense of Bosnevi's behavior would be to view it in the specific context of Nakşbendi sensibilities. This is, after all, a brotherhood that has been repeatedly identified with the pursuit of a rigorous and politicized orthodoxy—a kind of precursor of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century "neo-Sufism."[19] It is common, for example, to associate the Nakşbendi orthodoxy with staunch Sunnism and hostility to Shiʿites, which practitioners are said to have adopted because their spiritual genealogy (Ar. *silsila*) passes not through the Prophet's cousin and son-in-law ʿAli, as is more typical, but through his companion and the first caliph, Abu Bakr.[20] Some observers have demysticized this brotherhood by attributing to it a stark orthodoxy that presumably precluded central elements of mystical practice and thought, such as studying Ibn al-ʿArabi, and especially the doctrine of the "Unity of Being."[21]

Nevʿizade Ata'i, 179.

19. On the concept of neo-Sufism and the debate that it has spawned, see Nehemia Levtzion and John O. Voll, Introduction to *Eighteenth Century Renewal and Reform in Islam*, 10–11; John O. Voll, "Linking Groups in the Networks of Eighteenth-Century Revivalist Scholars: The Mizjaji Family in Yemen," in *Eighteenth Century Renewal and Reform in Islam*, 83–87; idem, *Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modern World* (Boulder, Colo., 1982), 36–39; idem, Forward to J. Spencer Trimingham, *The Sufi Orders in Islam* (Oxford, 1998), ix–xiii; Nehemia Levtzion, "Eighteenth Century Sufi Brotherhoods: Structural, Organizational and Ritual Change," in *Islam: Essays on Scripture, Thought and Society: A Festschrift in Honour of Anthony H. Johns*, ed. Peter G. Riddell and Tony Street (Leiden, 1997), 147–60; R. S. O'Fahey, *Enigmatic Saint: Ahmad Ibn Idris and the Idrisi Tradition* (London, 1990), 1–9; R. S. O'Fahey and Bernd Radtke, "Neo-Sufism Reconsidered," *Der Islam* 70 (1993): 52–87.

20. Algar views hostility to Shiʿites as a fundamental trait of this brotherhood, one that derived from its unique spiritual genealogy combined with the fact of its emergence in the broader Islamic world at a time of intense Sunni-Shiʿite rivalry. See Hamid Algar "The Naqshbandī Order in Republican Turkey," paper presented at the Berliner Institut für Vergleichende Sozialforschung (December 1981), 1–2.

21. For the notion that the Nakşbendiye was a *tarikat* of "stark orthodoxy," see, for example, Şerif Mardin, "The Nakshibendi Order of Turkey," in *Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Polities, Economies, and Militance*, vol. 3 of

Most common of all has been an image of the Nakşbendiye as a rigorously orthodox brotherhood whose concern with securing the implementation of Islamic law (*şeri'at*, Ar. *shari'a*) in society made it into a perpetual instrument of political involvement and activism. In the words of one scholar, two prominent characteristics have determined the role and impact of this brotherhood throughout its history: "strict adherence to Islamic Law (*Shari'ah*) and the traditions of the Prophet (*Sunnah*)," and a "determined effort to influence the life and thought of the ruling classes and to bring the state closer to religion."[22] Others have noted especially the involvement of Nakşbendi practitioners, most typically of the later Müceddidi and Halidi (Ar. Mujaddidi and Khalidi) phases in the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries, in various instances of activism in defense of Muslim rule and the *şeri'at*-based order—whether against non-Muslim rulers, foreign encroachment, or religious syncretism.[23] Modern Turkish observers have especially emphasized Nakşbendis' opposition to the modernizing and secularizing projects of the state (though some have depicted them primarily as foes of "heterodoxy," at times in collaboration with the state).[24]

From the vantage point of these commonly accepted views, the involvement of Osman Bosnevi in the Kadızadeli campaign might seem altogether true to form. As a "representative" of a brotherhood that was both politicized and rigorously committed to the protection of the *şeri'at*-based order, the sheikh would have been rather naturally drawn to a campaign that set

The Fundamentalism Project, ed. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago, 1993), 206. For a critique of the common wisdom about this brotherhood's aversion to Ibn al-'Arabi, see Hamid Algar, "Reflections of Ibn 'Arabî in Early Naqshbandî Tradition," *Journal of the Muhyiddin Ibn 'Arabi Society* 10 (1991): 45–46, 59–61.

22. K. A. Nizami, "The Naqshbandiyyah Order," in *Islamic Spirituality: Manifestations*, ed. Seyyed Hossein Nasr (New York, 1991), 163.

23. On Nakşbendis in Mughal India, see, for example, Aziz Ahmad, "The Naqshbandi Reaction," in *Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment* (Oxford, 1964), 182–89. On the Caucasus, see Moshe Gammer, *Muslim Resistance to the Tsar* (London, 1994); Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, "Le Caucase," in *Les Voies D'Allah: Les Ordres mystiques dans l'islam des origines à aujourd'hui*, ed. Alexandre Popovic and Gilles Veinstein (Paris, 1996), 300–302; and the critique of Alexander Knysh in *Islamic Mysticism: A Short History* (Leiden, 2000), 294–300.

24. See Cemal Kafadar, "The New Visibility of Sufism in Turkish Studies and Cultural Life," in *The Dervish Lodge: Architecture, Art, and Sufism in Ottoman Turkey*, ed. Raymond Lifchez (Berkeley, 1992), 311. On the Nakşbendiye as a foe of heterodoxy, see Mardin, "Nakshibendi Order," 207; Džemal Ćehajić, "Socio-Political Aspects of the Naqshbandi Dervish Order in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Yugoslavia Generally," in *Naqshbandis: Cheminements et situation actuelle d'un ordre mystique Musulman*, eds. Marc Gaborieau, Alexandre Popovic, and Thierry Zarcone (Istanbul, 1990), 663–64.

out to enforce strict orthodoxy on the public. And he could well choose to use his mosque pulpit at Süleymaniye to participate in this campaign *despite the fact* that fellow Sufis were the principal target.

One problem with this interpretation is that the notion of Sufi sheikhs and *tekke* incumbents as representatives of their respective *tarikat*s assigns to *tarikat* affiliation an undue fixity and uniformity. More specifically, I propose that casting the pre-Müceddidi Nakşbendi sheikh Bosnevi in the context of the common wisdom about the Nakşbendiye is problematic because the common wisdom itself has been shaped disproportionately and uncritically by later Müceddidi and Halidi realities, by nineteenth-century history, and by modern images of organized Sufism.[25]

In a broader study of the pre-Müceddidi Ottoman Nakşbendiye, I found a *tarikat* that departed significantly from the common wisdom. Early Ottoman Nakşbendis no doubt made rigorous adherence to the Holy Law and the Prophet's custom one of the pillars of their identity. This was also a matter of public image: as one sixteenth-century commentator tells it, *şeri'at*-conscious men of religion themselves highlighted the unusual extent to which this *tarikat* was "insistent on conformity to the Prophet's practice and the Holy Law" (*mesnun ve-meşru'*).[26] But for these Nakşbendis, rigorous fidelity to the Holy Law was not a matter of setting a model of, let alone imposing on the public, certain norms of orthodoxy. Instead rigorous *şeri'at*-abidance—or what they called "acting with strictness" (*amel-i azimet*)—meant first and foremost personal observance of religious duties and careful sobriety in the Nakşbendi distinctive devotional ritual.[27] Nor were early Ottoman

25. See the discussion in Le Gall, esp. 4–7.

26. Latifi, *Tezkere-i Latifi*, ed. Ahmed Cevdet (Istanbul, 1314/1896–97), 52.

27. See the discussion in Le Gall, 110–13. For examples, see Mahmud b. Osman Lami'i Çelebi, *Terceme-i nefahat ül-üns* (Istanbul, 1289/1872–73), 468; *Tühfet et-talibin ve 'ümdet el-vasilin*, MS Süleymaniye Library (Istanbul), Fatih 5385, 72b, 73a, 87a; Mustafa b. Hüseyn el-Sadiki, *Al-Manhaj al-muwassil ila al-tariq al-abhaj*, MS Princeton University Library, Arabic Collection/New Series 974, 13b–14a; Taj al-Din al-'Uthmani, *Risala [fi bayan suluk al-] Naqshbandiyya*, MS al-Azhar Mosque Library (Cairo), Halim 33602, 172a; and the story of Baha' al-Din Naqshband's instruction to follow the *'amal bi'l-'azima* in Salah b. Mubarak al-Bukhari [=Muhammad Parsa?], *Anis al-talibin va-'uddat al-salikin*, ed. Khalil Ibrahim Sarıoğlu (Tehran, 1371 *sh.*/1992), 93; Fakhr al-Din 'Ali b. Husayn Va'iz Kashifi, *Rashahat-i 'ayn al-hayat*, ed. 'Ali Asghar Mu'iniyan, 2 vols. (Tehran, 2536 imperial/1977–78), 1:95; 'Abd al-Rahman Jami, *Nafahat al-uns min hazarat al-quds*, ed. Mehdi Tawhidipur (Tehran, 1336sh./1957), 384–86; Ahmed b. Mustafa Taşköprüzade, *Al-Shaqa'iq al-nu'maniyya fi 'ulama' al-dawla al-'uthmaniyya*, printed on the margin of Ibn Khalliqan, *Ta'rikh wafayat al-a'yan*, 2 vols. (Bulaq, 1299/1881–82), 1:378. On the meaning of *'azima* and *rukhsa* in legal and Sufi discourse, see I. Goldziher, "'Azima," and R. Peters and J. G. J. ter Haar, "Rukhṣa," *EI*[2].

Nakşbendis invested in protecting the *şeri'at*-based order to the point of becoming demysticized. They claimed superiority in both *şeri'at*-abidance and the mystical quest. They took much pride in communing with deceased Sufi masters via their "spiritual presence" (*ruhaniyet*), or in the method called *rabıta*, in which disciples were taught to fix the visual form of the sheikh in the imagination as a conduit for the flow of divine energy. Many of them were devotees of Ibn al-ʿArabi, whose mystical teachings they studied and disseminated.[28]

There is also little evidence of early Ottoman Nakşbendi sheikhs seeking political influence or engaging in political activism. A number of sheikhs in the capital developed relations with state officials or members of the Ottoman dynasty. They gave mystical advice and solace and received patronage in the form of gifts, access to the court, and endowed *tekke*s—though in all this they were less conspicuous than other Sufis, especially the Halvetis.[29] The one exception to this pattern occurred in faraway Anatolian Kurdistan under conditions of war with the Shiʿite Safavids of Iran in the early seventeenth century. It involved a Diyarbakır-based Nakşbendi sheikh, Mahmud Urmavi (d. 1048/1638), who turned a family tradition of Sufi communal leadership into a career of overt political involvement and influence reminiscent of that of Sheikh 'Ubaydullah Ahrar of Samarkand (d. 895/1490) in late Timurid Transoxania (though this time the setting was provincial and the scale decidedly more modest).[30]

Even under circumstances of heightened sectarian tensions, as was the case following the rise of the Safavids to power in Iran around 1500 and the ensuing battles between Safavids and Ottomans, early Ottoman Nakşbendis did not rush to turn their distinct spiritual genealogy (passing through Abu Bakr) from a marker of spiritual affiliation to one of sectarian and political

28. See below and the penultimate section of the article.

29. See accounts on Sheikh Ishak Buhari-i Hindi in Ayvansarayı, 1:219; on Uzun Muslihüddin, in Taşköprüzade, 1:561–62 and Beliğ-i Bursevi İsma'il Efendi, *Güldeste-i riyaz-i 'irfan* (Bursa, 1302/1884–5), 180; on Ahmed Sadik Taşkendi, in Nev'izade Ata'i, 362 and Mustafa Selânikî, *Tarih-i Selânikî*, ed. Mehmet İpşirli, 2 vols. with consecutive pagination (Istanbul, 1989), 173; and on Şa'ban Efendi, in Nev'izade Ata'i, 371–72, 380, Mustafa b. Hayreddin, *Silsile-i hocagan-i nakşbendiye*, MS Süleymaniye Library (Istanbul), Hüsrev Paşa 408, 14b, and Selânikî, 343–44. For the Halvetis and Ottoman politics, see the penultimate section of the article.

30. On his unusual career, see Na'ima, 3:385–92; Uşakizade, 48–49; Şeyhi, 3:62; Evliya Çelebi, *Seyahatname*, 10 vols. (Istanbul, 1314–57/1896–1938), 4:53–55; İbrahim Peçevi, *Ta'rih-i Peçevi*, 2 vols. (Istanbul 1283/1866), 2:461–62; Katib Çelebi, *Fezleke-i Katib Çelebi*, 2 vols. (Istanbul, 1286–7/1869–70), 2:207; Martin van Bruinessen, "The Naqshbandi Order in 17th-Century Kurdistan," in *Naqshbandis: Cheminements at situation actuelle*, 340–52; Le Gall, 75–79.

loyalties.[31] In particular, we have no evidence in sixteenth-century sources that these Nakşbendis set out to defend the Ottoman Sunni, orthodox, *şeri'at*-based order by aiding the Ottoman state in its critical campaign against the Shi'ite Safavids and their Kızılbaş followers in Anatolia. Modern Turkish scholars have argued that Nakşbendis were able to establish and entrench themselves in Ottoman society thanks to official patronage that was bestowed on them as a reward for their instrumentality in the anti-Kızılbaş campaign. But a careful examination suggests that what underlies this thesis is not evidence from sixteenth-century sources as much as interjected nineteenth-century realities and images—especially the story of the turning over of a number of Bektaşi lodges to presumably more orthodox Nakşbendi sheikhs following the suppression of the Bektaşis in the 1240s/1820s.[32]

Rather than politics, it was around devotional sobriety that early Ottoman Nakşbendis forged their identity. More than anything else, it was their sober devotional regimen that set them apart, determined their self and public image, and underlay their *double* claim—to rigorous *şeri'at*-abidance and to mystical excellence.[33] At center stage were a silent ritual of "recollection" (*zikr*, Ar. *dhikr*) and the technique of *rabıta*, the visualization of the sheikh's picture in the imagination as a conduit for the flow of divine energy. Between them, the *rabıta*, the silent *zikr*, and a particular method of *zikr* called *murakaba* enabled Nakşbendis to eschew common Sufi practices that they portrayed as ostentatious, inferior, unduly emotive, or incompatible with rigorous observance of the *şeri'at*. Night vigils, ritual meditative seclusion in a cell, and especially singing, listening to music, and dance as part of the communal *zikr* ritual all fell under this rubric. On the positive side, the triad of silent *zikr*, *rabıta*, and *murakaba* were valued for being individual, interiorized, and continuous techniques that ideally could turn into a practitioner's "natural disposition." They were to enable practitioners to become oblivious of anything other than God, including the very act of remembrance. And they were at the center of what the Nakşbendi manuals called "solitude

31. See the discussion in Le Gall, 129–33, and examples of *silsila*s in Nev'izade Ata'i, 61–62; *Tühfet et-talibin*, 80b–81b; *Risale-i şerife-i magrube fi usul-i ta'ife-i 'aliye-i nakşbendiye*, MS Süleymaniye Library (Istanbul), Es'ad Efendi 3702, 161a–b; and [Mustafa Sadiki], *Risala fi bayan tariq al-naqshband*, MS Süleymaniye Library (Istanbul) Es'ad Efendi 3772, 160a–161a.

32. See İrfan Gündüz, *Osmanlılarda Devlet-Tekke Münasabetleri* (Istanbul, 1984), 39–42, 63–66; Kasım Kufralı, "Molla İlâhî ve Kendisinden Sonraki Nakşbendîye Muhiti," *Türk Dili ve Edebiyatı Dergisi* 3 (1949), 143–45; Mardin, "Nakshibendi Order," 207; Le Gall, 140–50.

33. See the discussion in Le Gall, ch. 5.

within society" (Per. *khalvat dar anjuman*), that is the regimen of seeking God continuously, in an inconspicuous manner, and in the thick of society.[34]

Nakşbendis did not prohibit those practices that they portrayed as suspect or inferior. Instead they were content to encourage the eschewal of these practices by eliciting pride in the devotional alternative that they offered. Some sheikhs viewed periods of fasting or ritual seclusion as unnecessary, yet others practiced them as part of their own spiritual training or taught them to disciples.[35] Even when it came to the *zikr* ritual, Nakşbendis chose not to ban the vocal mode, but instead sought to emphasize the superiority and antiquity of the silent one by casting it as the "original way" or the technique most conducive to the mystic's goal of attaining closeness to God.[36] A number of Nakşbendi spiritual lineages, especially among Shafiʿi populations in Arabia and Kurdistan, practiced or even preferred a vocal method of recollection. Particularly famous for this were the Urmavi Nakşbendis of

34. On the significance and mode of performance of the *rabıta*, see Sadiki, *Manhaj*, 16b–17a; Taj al-Din al-ʿUthmani, *Risala Naqshbandiyya*, 165b; *Tühfet et-talibin*, 79a; *Risale-i şerife*, 174b–175a; *Şera'it ve nasa'ih-i meşa'ih*, MS Süleymaniye Library (Istanbul), Fatih 2658, 76b. Cf. Fritz Meier, *Zwei Abhandlungen über die Naqšbandiyya* (Istanbul, 1994); idem, *Meister und Schüler im Orden der Naqšbandiyya* (Heidelberg, 1995), 11–16, 22–23; Michel Chodkiewicz, "Quelques aspects des techniques spirituelles dans la *ṭarīqa* Naqshbandiyya," in *Naqshbandis: Cheminements et situation actuelle*, 75–78. For the Nakşbendi understanding of the *khalvat dar anjuman*, see Le Gall, 119 and note 46 below.

35. See Taj al-Din al-ʿUthmani, *Risala fi adab al-mashyakha wa'l-muridin al-talibin wa-shara'itihima*, MS India Office (London), Bijapur 459, 137b. See also accounts on Ahmed Sadik Taşkendi in Sadiki, *Manhaj*, 10b; on Mahmud Urmavi, in Şeyhi, 3:62 and *Şera'it*, 73a; and on Abdullah İlahi and Ahmed Buhari, in Lamiʿi Çelebi, 461 and 468 respectively.

36. See Sadiki, *Manhaj*, 8b, 16a; *Tühfet et-talibin*, 79a; Abdullah İlahi, *Meslek et-talibin ve'l-abidin*, MS Staatsbibliothek (Berlin), or. quart. 1471/2, 55b–57. A particular way of casting the silent *zikr* as the best and quintessential Nakşbendi method was to invoke one or another of three paradigmatic stories from the Nakşbendi tradition. The first related how the Prophet had taught this form of *zikr* to Abu Bakr during a dramatic moment of the Hijra that was graced with God's presence (*Tühfet et-talibin*, 81a; Mustafa b. Hayreddin, 4b–5a; Muhammad Qazvini, *Silsilanama-yi khwajagan-i naqshband*, MS Bibliothèque Nationale (Paris), Suppl. Persan 1418, 6a). The second identified the silent *zikr* as the technique that the paradigmatic spiritual guide Hızır conferred on the predecessor of the Nakşbendiye ʿAbd al-Khaliq Ghujduvani, instructing him to recite it while he was submerged in water (Kashifi, 1:35; Qazvini, 7b; *Tühfet et-talibin*, 80a; *Risale-i şerife*, 160b; Sadiki, *Risala*, 160b). The third had Ghujduvani's "spiritual presence" bestow this technique on Baha' al-Din Naqshband while instructing him to follow the *ʿamal bi'l-ʿazima* (see references in note 27).

Kurdistan, whose dramatic "saw *zikr*" Evliya Çelebi described as arousing in practitioners a state of "intoxication and bewilderment."[37]

Returning to our immediate subject, Osman Bosnevi, there is little to suggest, then, that simply by dint of his *tarikat* affiliation and formation this Nakşbendi sheikh and preacher would have been naturally drawn to a militant campaign seeking to protect the *şeri'at*-based order or to impose a strict orthodoxy on the public. Nakşbendis of Bosnevi's time and initiatic descent (his Sufi genealogy was directly Central Asian and his involvement with the Kadızadelis preceded by several decades the coming of the first Müceddidis from India) combined comfortably devotional sobriety with mystical speculation—often of the Ibn al-ʿArabi school. They were tolerant, if condescending, toward devotional practices that they deemed ostentatious or inferior. And they did not seek to make *şeri'at*-abidance into a political project.

One thing that these Nakşbendis did do was to define themselves and build their double claim to superiority (as mystical travelers and observers of the *şeri'at*) *in opposition to other Sufis* and their inferior, ostentatious, or suspect practices. Granted, these practices were treated with condescension, not banned. But in the understanding of some individuals—or under circumstances of open confrontation—condescension might give way to much harsher criticism. From this perspective, the involvement of Bosnevi with the Kadızadeli campaign can be seen as an *extension*, however far-fetched, of the premise of defining the Nakşbendiye in opposition to the inferior practices of other Sufis.

A text of Bosnevi's teachings or preaching could have clarified matters by revealing the substance of his rhetoric and perhaps shedding light on his strategy or motive. But no such text has come down to us, nor do we have any indication that Bosnevi's sermons were committed to writing, as were those of his Nakşbendi colleague and imperial mosque preacher Ya'kub Kayseriyeli.[38] Thus our assessment here is based in some measure on

37. On Kurdistan, see Evliya Çelebi, 4:33; Na'ima, 3:385; *Şera'it*, 71a–72b; Le Gall, 74–75. On the line of Ahmad al-Qushashi and Ibrahim al-Kurani in Arabia, see Muhammad Hasan Ibn al-'Ujaymi, *Khabaya al-zawaya*, MS Dar al-Kutub Library (Cairo), Ta'rikh 2410, 47a; Mustafa Fathallah al-Hamawi, *Fawa'id al-irtihal wa-nata'ij al-safar fi akhbar al-qarn al-hadi 'ashar*, MSS Dar al-Kutub Library (Cairo), Ta'rikh Taymur 923, 2:189, 602 and Ta'rikh 1093, 3:345a–b; P. Voorhoeve, "'Abd al-Ra'uf al-Sinkili," *EI*². See also below, note 56.

38. On Kayseriyeli, see Uşakizade, 554. One piece by Bosnevi, the *Subhe-i Sibyan*, is available in an edition printed in Istanbul in 1251/1835. It is a poem of praise and yearning for God whose 29 sections are written each in a distinct meter. It does not, however, make any allusion to the Kadızadeli controversy or to Bosnevi's role as a mosque preacher. I am grateful to Dr. Semiramis Çavuşoğlu of IRCICA for procuring the *Subhe* for me.

conjecture. Still, one can imagine Bosnevi adopting the Kadızadeli rhetoric (perhaps in some recast fashion) and voicing it from his mosque pulpit as a means of setting the Nakşbendis apart from other Sufis and of promoting and proving the feasibility of a counter-model of "correct Sufism" embodied in the Nakşbendiye. This would have been an extension of the habit of defining this *tarikat* in opposition to other Sufis, as well as a replay of sorts of what the Khwajaganis analyzed by DeWeese had done in Timurid Transoxania. In such a configuration, it may be added, Bosnevi would have joined the Kadızadeli campaign not *despite the fact* that fellow Sufis were the target, but rather *for this very reason.*

Nakşbendis and the Kadızadeli Affair: The Range of Responses

From a somewhat different angle, one may want to examine how other Nakşbendis aligned themselves in this particular conflict. Was Bosnevi's stance unique? Do we know of fellow Nakşbendis who shared his thinking? Can we place him within a larger Nakşbendi tradition sympathetic to the Kadızadeli agenda?

A number of Nakşbendis had ties to Birgili Mehmed Efendi, the sixteenth-century scholar and preacher whose puritanical ideas the Kadızadelis posthumously claimed as their intellectual inspiration and turned into militant activism. Birgili's first patron was Kızıl Abdurrahman Amasyalı (d. 963/1556), a chief military judge (*kazi'asker*) of Rumeli and a Nakşbendi devotee and benefactor. A second patron, the imperial tutor Ata'ullah Efendi (d. 979/1571–2), who established the puritan in his *medrese* in Birgi, was also a Nakşbendi devotee.[39] Another Nakşbendi, the translator of the *Rashahat-i 'ayn al-hayat* into Turkish, Ma'ruf Trabzuni (d. 1002/1594), served as judge in İzmir not far from Birgi shortly after Birgili's death. In time Nev'izade Ata'i was to describe Trabzuni as a "commander of right," perhaps an indication that he too had been inspired by the puritan from Birgi.[40]

Particularly intriguing is a story according to which Ahmed Tirevi (d. 1033/1623–4 or 1034/1624–5), Bosnevi's Nakşbendi preceptor and long-serving predecessor at the Hekim Çelebi Tekke, was himself at one point close to Birgili. The story appears in a biographical notice appended to a manuscript copy of the *Silsile-i hocagan* of Mustafa b. Hayreddin (itself a translation-adaptation of the *Silsilanama-yi khwajagan-i naqshband* of Muhammad Qazvini), and it must have been authored by one of Tirevi's disciples, who was the copier of the manuscript. Tirevi is said to have come to

39. On Birgili's career and ties with these two early patrons, see Nev'izade Ata'i, 179–81; Kufrevî, "Birgewī," *EI*[2].

40. Nev'izade Ata'i, 327–28; Mehmed Tahir Bursalı, *Osmanlı mü'ellifleri*, 3 vols. (Istanbul, 1333–42/1914–24), 2:22.

know and admire Birgili while serving as a young jurisconsult (*müfti*) in Tire not far from Birgi. He called Birgili "beloved" or "saintly" (*aziz*) and "most worthy of companionship" (*ahakk-ı sohbet*), and he applauded his summoning people to "acting with strictness" (*azimet*, the very term and concept that Nakşbendis employed in reference to their own rigorous adherence to the *şeri'at*).[41] However, the reliability of this account is open to question because its author is anonymous and parts of it are ambiguous or inaccurate. Ultimately there is not enough substance in this story to suggest that Tirevi, inspired by his early acquaintance with Birgili, was the individual who nurtured in Osman Bosnevi the activist attitude that eventually led him to become one of the capital's principal Kadızadeli preachers.

Granted, it may be that Bosnevi himself was the anonymous Tirevi disciple who authored this piece; in so doing, he could have hoped to make the Kadızadeli agenda more acceptable to Nakşbendis by suggesting that his respected Nakşbendi preceptor, Tirevi, now deceased, had been an admirer of Birgili's puritanism in his time. But this is no more than informed speculation.[42] Other than this, we have no evidence that Bosnevi sought to justify or bequeath his Kadızadeli agenda to his Nakşbendi disciples. Nor do we know of other Nakşbendi sheikhs doubling as mosque preachers who used their pulpits in the service of the movement. Of one other mosque preacher and disciple of Tirevi by the name Ya'kub Kayseriyeli (d. 1079/1668), we are told that his sermons at the Sultan Selim and Bayezid Mosques were written down and brought him much fame. This could be an indication that they were more learned than Bosnevi's sermons—or, conversely, that they were dramatic and polemical.[43]

One prominent individual who did, in time, combine Nakşbendi and Kadızadeli connections was the *Şeyhülislam* Feyzullah Efendi (d. 1115/1703). Feyzullah began his learned career in his native Erzurum under the patronage of Vani Efendi (d.1096/1685), who soon left for Istanbul, where he would serve as the imperial tutor and head up the last wave of Kadızadeli activism.

41. Mustafa b. Hayreddin, 15b (I thank Professor Leslie Peirce and her graduate students, Hasan Karataş and Giv Nasiri, of the University of California, Berkeley for suggestions concerning ambiguous parts of this piece). For Qazvini's Persian original and the circumstances of its writing and circulation, see Le Gall, 147–48.

42. The note was apparently penned very shortly after Tirevi's death, that is not long after Kadızade Mehmed had begun his career as an imperial mosque preacher, but still before his public confrontations with the Halveti sheikh Abdülmecid Sivasi in the 1040s/1630s (for these events, see Çavuşoğlu, 68–72, 82–92).

43. See Uşakizade, 554. A number of treatises by prominent Kadızadeli preachers may have originated as sermons (see the discussion of Kadızadeli writings in Çavuşoğlu, 3–4 and Part III).

It was Vani who brought the future *şeyhülislam* to the capital in 1074/1663, gave him his daughter in marriage, nurtured him as a lifelong confidant, and helped promote him quickly in his *ilmiye* career.[44] Some twenty years and many political upheavals later, Feyzullah was initiated as a Nakşbendi disciple. His preceptor was not Bosnevi (by that time long deceased), but rather a newcomer from Transoxania via India and the first propagator of the Nakşbendiye-Müceddidiye in the Ottoman capital, Sheikh Murad-i Bukhari (d. 1132/1720). Of the extent of Feyzullah's involvement with the *tarikat* we know little. We only have the account of the historian Khalil al-Muradi, a great-grandson of Sheikh Murad, who describes how during two lengthy sojourns in the Ottoman capital beginning in 1092/1681 the sheikh initiated into the *tarikat* and instructed in the Nakşbendi *zikr* many of the city's high-ranking ulema. Among them was Feyzullah, who is said to have conferred with him and paid him "special reverence."[45] By then, Feyzullah's old patron, Vani Efendi, had died or was about to die, and the Kadızadeli movement was fading away. Clearly, in Feyzullah's case, the convergence of Nakşbendi and Kadızadeli connections was nowhere as direct or important as in the case of Bosnevi.

While other Nakşbendis beside Bosnevi (and less directly Feyzullah) did not become involved with the Kadızadeli campaign, it is noteworthy that Nakşbendis, at least in the capital, did not venture to challenge the Kadızadelis, either. Other Sufis did, Halveti sheikhs being the most outspoken. In the 1040s/1630s, especially Abdülmecid Sivasi launched the fight from the pulpit of the Sultan Ahmed Mosque and through a number of direct public confrontations with Kadızade Mehmed.[46] Two decades later, disciples of the Halveti sheikh Abdulahad Nuri took on Birgili Mehmed in written refutations, accusing him of invoking weak Prophetic traditions in support of the ideas he advanced in his *Al-Tariqa al-muhammadiyya*.[47] Then it was the turn of another Halveti sheikh, Niyazi Misri, to take on Vani Efendi personally. He accused Vani of promoting debauchery at court, enriching himself unlawfully, and engaging in all manner of vice.[48]

44. On Feyzullah's career, see Orhan F. Köprülü, "Feyzullah Efendi," *İslam Ansiklopedisi*. On this final phase of Kadızadeli activism, see Zilfi, "Kadızadelis," 263–65, and Çavuşoğlu, 149–82.

45. Muhammad Khalil al-Muradi, *Matmah al-wajid fi tarjamat al-walid al-majid*, MS British Library (London), or. 4050, 23b–26a; idem, *Silk al-durar fi a'yan al-qarn al-thani 'ashar*, 4 vols. (Bulaq, 1291–1301/1874–83), 4:130. On the career and influence of Sheikh Murad, see Hamid Algar, "A Brief History of the Naqshbandī Order," in *Naqshbandis: Cheminements et situation actuelle*, 27–28.

46. Zilfi, "Kadızadelis," 255–56; Çavuşoğlu, 82–92.

47. Zilfi, "Kadızadelis," 261–62; Çavuşoğlu, 134–41.

48. Çavuşoğlu, 170–72, 176–78.

Sheikhs of other *tarikat*s also spoke out against Kadızadeli rhetoric and action. The Mevlevi sheikh İsma'il Dede joined Abdülmecid Sivasi in accusations that Kadızade Mehmed was a "heretic who denied the [Sufi] path and the Friends of God."[49] When very early on (as Kadızade Mehmed was just beginning his career as an imperial preacher) Müniri Belğradi wrote to Sufi sheikhs of the capital denouncing Sufi music and dance, the rebuttal came from a Bayrami sheikh, Hüseyn Lamekani; in his response, he insisted that all these practices had the sanction of important religious authorities and were accepted by the Prophet.[50] A Çelveti sheikh and preacher, Zakirzade Efendi, later made the same point from the pulpit of the Fatih Mosque.[51] Finally, in 1066/1656, two Celveti sheikhs, Cennet Efendi and Ğafuri Mahmud Efendi, joined the Halveti sheikh Erdebili Ahmed (brother of the afore-mentioned Üstüvani's preacher-collaborator Çelebi Şeyh) in bringing the case of the Kadızadelis' "usurpation of power" and anti-Sufi militancy before the *şeyhülislam*, Hanefi Efendi. A short while later, the leaders of the movement were banished from Istanbul in the wake of new bold affronts to *tekke*s and mosques and the appointment of Köprülü Mehmed as grand vizier.[52]

We know of no Istanbul Nakşbendis who took similar stands against the militant preachers, either in efforts to exonerate fellow Sufis or in defense of denounced practices and beliefs that they themselves held dear. An exception of sorts may be the *şeyhülislam* and confidant of Sultan Murad IV, Zekeriyazade Yahya (d. 1053/1644), who was initiated into the Nakşbendiye years before while serving as judge in Egypt. Yahya expressed a distaste for the Kadızadelis and sympathy for their Sufi enemies in his poetry,[53] for example in the following couplet, whose recitation Üstüvani's Kadızadeli preacher-collaborators denounced and sought to ban a few years after his death:

> In the mosque let hypocrites have their hypocrisy,
> Come to the tavern where neither pretense nor pretender be.[54]

49. Katib Çelebi, *Mizan ül-hakk*, 126.
50. Çavuşoğlu, 196–98, quoting Lamekani's letter.
51. Na'ima, 5:59.
52. Na'ima, 6:240–41.
53. On Yahya as poet, see E. J. W. Gibb, *A History of Ottoman Poetry*, 6 vols. (London, 1900–1909), 3:273–84. On his initiation into the Nakşbendiye by a Syrian sheikh, 'Abd al-Qadir al-Ban, whom he later appointed to be the head of the descendants of the Prophet (*nakibüleşraf*) in Aleppo, see Muhammad Raghib al-Halabi al-Tabbakh, *A'lam al-nubala' fi ta'rikh Halab al-shahba'*, 7 vols. (Aleppo, 1342–45/1923–26), 6:232. See also the biographical notices on Yahya in Na'ima, 4:62–64 and Şeyhi, 3:110–14, and for Yahya's several tenures as *şeyhülislam*, Zilfi, *Politics of Piety*, appendix, 246.
54. On the Kadızadelis' attack on Yahya's wine poetry, see Na'ima, 5:55–56.

Still, Na'ima's account suggests that Yahya's attitude toward the Kadızadelis was rather more complex. The *şeyhülislam* admitted to confidants that he had himself appointed some of the "hypocrites" to high positions. He also asserted that they were courageous in applying the principle of "forbidding wrong" and highly effective in making the "ignorant masses" listen.[55]

A number of Nakşbendi devotees in Arabia and Damascus did become in time sufficiently scandalized by the Kadızadelis to mount criticism, though this came rather late and might be less than explicit. In Medina, the Nakşbendi and Shattari sheikh Ibrahim al-Kurani (d. 1101/1690) took on critics of Ibn al-ʿArabi in a number of polemical treatises, insisting that the great mystic's teachings were consistent with the Holy Law and did not encourage antinomian behavior.[56] On one occasion Kurani became embroiled in an argument with a visiting imperial tutor from Istanbul, who informed him of his own campaign to uproot the vocal *zikr* ritual from the mosques of the capital. Against the advice of well-wishers, Kurani took strong objection to the position of this well-connected visitor, who must have been the last Kadızadeli leader, Vani Efendi.[57] A student of Kurani and Nakşbendi author, Ibn al-Mimi, also ventured into the debate, declaring anybody opposed to vocal recollection (though without naming names) "ignorant" and "pigheaded."[58]

In Damascus, as Barbara von Schlegell has shown, the prolific Sufi-scholar and Nakşbendi devotee ʿAbd al-Ghani al-Nabulusi (d. 1143/1731) made countering a spate of anti-Sufi rhetoric and harassment by "ignorant prayer leaders" and "base students of jurisprudence" his life-long mission. Nabulusi was both a passionate defender of vocal recollection and an enthusiast of Ibn al-ʿArabi's Sufism (and of Ibn al-ʿArabi the saint). He devoted a host of his works to refuting accusations against everything from practicing

On the use of tavern, wine, and drunkenness imagery to symbolize the Sufi quest for mystical transformation, see the discussion in Zilfi, *Politics of Piety*, 171–72; Carl W. Ernst, *The Shambhala Guide to Sufism* (Boston, 1997), ch. 6.

55. Na'ima, 6:238–39.

56. Ibn al-'Ujaymi, 37b; Alexander Knysh, "Ibrāhīm al-Kūrānī (d. 1101/1690): An Apologist for *waḥdat al-wujūd*," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, third series, 5 (1995): 39–47; A. H. Johns, "Kūrānī," *EI*². In one treatise, Kurani stated that Shafi'is, as were most of his own followers, prized especially the vocal method of recollection (see *Ithaf al-munib al-awwah bi-fadl al-jahr bi-dhikr Allah*, MS Princeton University Library, Garrett Collection/Yahuda Section 3869/1, especially 3b–4a, 8a).

57. Saiyid Athar Abbas Rizvi, *A History of Sufism in India*, 2 vols. (New Delhi, 1978–83), 2:331–32, quoting Shah Waliullah, *Anfas al-'arifin*.

58. Husayn b. Muhammad al-Basri Ibn al-Mimi, *Nazm al-sumut al-zabrajiyya fi silsilat al-sada al-naqshbandiyya*, MS Süleymaniye Library (Istanbul), Aşir Efendi 176, 8b.

vocal recollection, to performing the Mevlevi music and dance recitals, conducting ecstatic Sufi sessions in mosques, visiting saints' tombs, making supplications to the dead, smoking tobacco, and looking at the face of beardless youths. Granted, he was less than explicit about the identity of the accusers. But there were more than sufficient clues in references such as "oafish Turkish students," "ignorant *fuqāha*'," and "fanatics . . . sponging at the table of the book's [Birgili's *Al-Tariqa al-muhammadiyya*] many benefits" for Nabulusi's biographer to conclude that what he was targeting were remnants of the Kadızadeli movement, now relocated to the empire's Arab urban environment.[59]

Thus Nakşbendis themselves could be of more than one mind toward the Kadızadelis. The *tekke* incumbent and imperial mosque preacher Osman Bosnevi was an outright collaborator. Zekeryazade Yahya Efendi, as the *şeyhülislam*, was naturally more given to balance and pragmatism: he admitted to having appointed Kadızadeli followers to high positions and praised them for their ability to "make the ignorant masses listen," while at the same time expressing his distaste for the Kadızadeli campaign and sympathy for their Sufi victims in his poetry. Ibrahim al-Kurani from Medina, with his multiple Sufi affiliations and mostly Shafi'i followers, chose to defend vocal recollection and listening to music even when this embroiled him in a heated dispute with the visiting Kadızadeli leader Vani Efendi. Nabulusi, in Damascus, meanwhile, was compelled into a life-long if subtle mission of defending Sufism in the face of attacks that he perceived as offensive and deluded and as originating with lowly Turks to boot.

Drawing Boundaries

In the end, Bosnevi's decision to cast his lot with the Kadızadeli campaign is probably best understood as a pre-emptive measure. The anti-Sufi frenzy that Kadızade Mehmed and his followers spread from their mosque pulpits was a warning sign that unless boundaries were clearly drawn Nakşbendis too could become the target of criticism—as they soon did, if more subtly and indirectly. We see this in Vani Efendi's treatise against Sufi *bid'as*, in which he admonished Muslims to refrain from reading Sufi literature. Probably in order to make the point that all such literature was reprehensible, Vani

59. Barbara Rosenow von Schlegell, "Sufism in the Ottoman Arab World: Shaykh 'Abd al-Ghanī al-Nābulusī (d. 1143/1731)" (Ph. D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1997), ch. 1 and conclusion (quotations from pp. 80, 81, 85, 100, 108). Although Nabulusi was initiated by a Nakşbendi sheikh and, in time, wrote a widely circulating treatise on Nakşbendi beliefs and practice, von Schlegell argues that his Sufi affiliation is best understood in more generic terms, not as one with a fixed *tarikat* or a particular living spiritual master (see esp. ch. 2).

focused not on the writings of Ibn al-ʿArabi or on some Halveti or Mevlevi treatise in defence of music. Instead he listed three great Sufi classics, the *Ihyaʾ ʿulum al-din* and the *Kimiya-yi saʿadat* of Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (d. 505/111) and the *ʿAwarif al-maʿarif* of Abu Hafs ʿUmar al-Suhrawardi (d. 635/1234)). Alongside these, he mentioned two later works, the *Nafahat al-uns* of ʿAbd al-Rahman Jami (d. 898/1492) and the *Rashahat-i ʿayn al-hayat* of Fakhr al-Din ʿAli b. Husayn Kashifi (d. 939/1532–3), both from the Nakşbendi biographical tradition (the *Rashahat* was the principal hagiographical work centered on Sheikh ʿUbaydullah Ahrar of Samarkand).[60]

By Bosnevi's time Ottoman Nakşbendis had long built a reputation for being more insistent on fidelity to the Prophet's practice and the Holy Law than other brotherhoods. But they were not immune to criticism. They, too, held beliefs and engaged in practices that the Kadızadeli campaign now brought to the forefront of popular attention and reopened to criticism. Many Nakşbendis were celebrated for communing with prophets, deceased Sufi masters, or more generally the saints or "friends of God." Some communed spiritually with the paradigmatic mystical guide Hızır, whose figure featured prominently in the Nakşbendi sacred history, just as it was specifically targeted by Kadızadeli detractors.[61] As was common, Nakşbendis believed that the spiritual presence of the "friends of God" was most accessible at their tombs, and they had a long tradition of visiting tombs and communing spiritually with their deceased residents. The Ottoman scholar Katib Çelebi noted specifically this Nakşbendi tradition in his *Mizan ül-hakk*, the contemporary account devoted to examining a host of the controversial issues that the Kadızadeli campaign had raised.[62]

Pre-Müceddidi Ottoman Nakşbendis also prided themselves on studying and disseminating the mystical teachings of Ibn al-ʿArabi—another Kadızadeli *bête noire*. Committed, as they were, to offering devotees a superior mystical regimen, they must have found attractive both the mystical insights and the elusiveness of the "Greatest Master" (*şeyh-i ekber*), as he

60. Vani Mehmed Efendi, *Tasavvufu bid'atlardan sakınmaya da'ir risale*, quoted in Çavuşoğlu, 163.

61. For example, see accounts on Abdullah İlahi in Lami'i Çelebi, 461; on Ahmed Sadik Taşkendi in Sadiki, *Manhaj*, 11b, 13b; and on Ahmad Ibn 'Allan and Zakarya' al-Bihari in Ibn al-'Ujaymi, 108a and 128b respectively. Usually such communications were experienced as unsolicited gifts (Ar. *fath*, pl. *futuh*) bestowed by divine grace, but Nakşbendis learnt from their eponym that they could also be brought forth through intense spiritual concentration. See Johan G. J. ter Haar, "The Importance of the Spiritual Guide in the Naqshbandi Order," in *The Legacy of Medieval Persian Sufism (1150–1500)*, vol. 2 of *The Heritage of Sufism*, ed. Leonard Lewisohn (London, 1992, rep. Oxford, 1999), 317.

62. Katib Çelebi, *Mizan ül-hakk*, 77.

had come to be known to admirers. They were, in this regard, also heirs to Persian Sufism, where interest in Ibn al-ʿArabi had developed earlier than in the Arab or Ottoman Sufi traditions.[63] And they could refer to prominent Central Asian spiritual ancestors such as ʿUbaydallah Ahrar, ʿAbd al-Rahman Jami, and Muhammad Parsa (a direct disciple of the eponym, Bahaʾ al-Din Naqshband) in insisting that studying the mystic's teachings was consonant with rigorous fidelity to the *şeriʿat*.[64] Many Ottoman Nakşbendis contributed to the dissemination of the mystic's teachings by writing learned commentaries and polemical tracts, incorporating his ideas and terminology into everything from Koranic exegesis to poetry, and conducting sessions of reading from the *Fusus al-hikam*.[65] Of one Nakşbendi and Shattari sheikh from Medina, Ahmad al-Qushashi (d. 1071/1661), it was said that he was his generation's "chief advocate" of the doctrine of the "Unity of Being."[66]

Granted, by the time the Nakşbendiye was being disseminated in Ottoman society beginning in the second half of the fifteenth century, the harsh criticism of Ibn al-ʿArabi—especially that voiced by Ibn Taymiyya in the early fourteenth century—was a thing of the past. The mystic had since gained considerable following and respectability in Ottoman society. His ideas not only permeated mysticism and poetry; they were being taught in *medreses*

63. On the role of Persian Sufism in the diffusion of Ibn al-ʿArabi's thought, see Michel Chodkiewicz, "The *Futūḥāt Makkiyya* and Its Commentators: Some Unresolved Enigmas," in *The Legacy of Medieval Sufism*, 219–21. In Kufralı's opinion, it was the reputation of Central Asian Nakşbendis as experts in the mystic's teachings that led Sultan Mehmed II to build the first Nakşbendi *tekke* of the capital for a Bukharan immigrant, Sheikh Ishak Buhari-i Hindi (see Kufralı, "Molla İlâhî," 130).

64. See Kashifi, 1:244–45; Algar, "Reflections," 48–50, 53–56; Kasım Kufralı, "Nakşbendiliğin Kuruluş ve Yayılışı" (Ph. D. dissertation, Istanbul University, 1949) (MS Istanbul University, Türkiyat Enstitüsü, TY 337), 65–69.

65. For example, see accounts on Baba Niʿmetullah Nahçıvanı in Bursalı, 1:40–41, Algar, "Reflections," 58–59, and Kufralı, "Molla İlâhî," 147; on Abdullah İlahi, in Algar, "Reflections," 58 and Mustafa Kara, "Molla İlâhî: Un précurseur de la Nakşibendiye en Anatolie," in *Naqshbandis: Cheminements et situation actuelle*, 312–16, 320, 327–28; on Muhyiddin Halife, in Beliğ-i Bursevi, 181 and Mehmed b. Mustafa Baldırzade, *Revzat el-evliya'*, MS Staatsbibliothek (Berlin), or. oct. 2937, 120b; and on Taj al-Din al-ʿUthmani, in Ibn al-ʿUjaymi, 122a, 126b, Mahmud b. Ashraf al-Husayni, *Tuhfat al-salikin fi dhikr taj al-ʿarifin*, MS Dar al-Kutub Library (Cairo), Musawwarat Kharij al-Dar 116/13 (copy of MS in the Qadi Hasan al-Siyaghi Library in Sanʿa, Yemen), 632, and Muhammad Amin b. Fadlallah al-Muhibbi, *Khulasat al-athar fi aʿyan al-qarn al-hadi ʿashar*, 4 vols. (Cairo, 1284/1867–68, reprint, Beirut, n.d.), 4:202–203, 442. See also accounts on a number of associates of the line of Qushashi and Kurani in Arabia in Muhibbi, 1:244, 402, 2:167, 474; Ibn al-ʿUjaymi, 37b, 68a; Bursalı, 2:27; Knysh, "Ibrāhīm al-Kūrānī," 39–47.

66. Muhibbi, 1:345.

and influenced the main body of scholarship.[67] After the conquest of the Arab lands in the early sixteenth century, many came to view him as a patron saint of the Ottoman dynasty thanks to his *Al-Shajara al-nuʿmaniyya fiʾl-dawla al-ʿuthmaniyya*, in which he was said to have predicted the conquest.[68] Sultan Selim I ordered the rebuilding of his tomb and the construction of an adjacent mosque complex carrying his own name in the Damascus suburb of Salihiyya. Concurrently, the *kaziʿasker* of Anatolia and future *şeyhülislam* Kemalpaşazade issued an exonerative legal opinion (*fetva*) that bestowed upon him an indubitable official recognition.[69] But a century later, the Kadızadeli campaign was turning the tables on Ibn al-ʿArabi's reputation and creating a harsh climate for his admirers and for Sufis more generally. In this atmosphere, even a respected Nakşbendi sheikh might have reason to worry.

Perhaps Osman Bosnevi felt also personally vulnerable because he used to conduct sessions of *zikr* at the Süleymaniye Mosque while he served as its Friday preacher during the 1050s/1640s.[70] We may safely assume that any *zikr* ritual he conducted would have been highly sober, nothing like those loud and ecstatic affairs for which some Sufis were now being so harshly denounced. Still, time must have seemed ripe for drawing boundaries as clearly as possible. And it was most likely the drawing of such boundaries that the sheikh set out to achieve by joining the Kadızadeli campaign of anti-Sufi rhetoric.

From a more general perspective, Bosnevi's stance was also a product and reflection of the Ottoman practice of appointing Sufi sheikhs as mosque preachers (which, at least at the more senior level of imperial mosques, involved the approval of the sultan or the *şeyhülislam*). This doubling of

67. A. Ateş, "Ibn al-ʿArabi," *EI²*; William Chittick, "Rūmī and *waḥdat al-wujūd*," in *Poetry and Mysticism in Islam: The Heritage of Rūmī*, ed. Amin Banani, Richard Hovannisian, and Georges Sabagh (Cambridge, 1994), 77–79.

68. On the (probably spurious) *Al-Shajara al-nuʿmaniyya* see Michel Chodkiewicz, *An Ocean Without a Shore: Ibn ʿArabī, the Book, and the Law*, trans. David Streight (Albany, New York, 1993), 17.

69. A. Ateş, "Ibn al-ʿArabī," *EI²*. Barbara von Schlegell argues that more than conferring legitimacy on Ibn al-ʿArabi, the rebuilding of his tomb was designed to confer religious legitimacy on the sultan and the Ottoman dynasty by tying them to his monumental legacy and charisma (von Schlegell, 243–46).

70. In his description of his pursuits there, Uşakizade (p. 551) has him preaching and conducting *zikr* (*vaʿz ve tezkir ... oldu*), among other things. Granted, the phrase is formulaic; the same is said in other biographies, including that of Üstüvani Mehmed in Şeyhi, 558.

functions was one manifestation of how socially and culturally integrated Sufis and their leaders had become in this society. And it afforded Sufis a vantage point from which to become even more so. But the dual role afforded to some sheikhs as Sufi masters and mosque preachers also invited resentment from those who might otherwise win lucrative preaching positions. It was a tool, too, for bureaucratizing the *tarikat*s and bringing their sheikhs under the state's administrative control.[71] And it put individuals such as Bosnevi in public and highly visible positions, where they would be obliged to take a stand when a controversy such that the Kadızadelis launched drew the wider mosque-going urban population into what under other circumstances would have remained an academic debate.

That Halvetis were the principal target of the Kadızadeli campaign was also significant. Nakşbendis and Halvetis had been competitors over followers and material patronage ever since their arrival in the newly conquered Ottoman capital some two centuries before (the first from Transoxania, the latter from the Caucasus and Azerbaijan via Amasya). Right from the start—when Sultan Bayezid II brought his old spiritual guide, Mehmed Cemaleddin Aksarayı, from Amasya and installed him in a former church turned into the lavishly endowed mosque complex of Koca Mustafa Paşa—the Halvetis scored considerable political and material success.[72] From Bayezid went forth a long line of sultans who sought spiritual counsel with Halveti sheikhs and bestowed material patronage on their institutions.[73] Nathalie Clayer has argued that this royal favor was a reward for political collaboration: Halvetis, particularly of the more "orthodox" branches, extended much valuable help to the Ottoman campaign of "Sunnitization," as she has termed the state's efforts to win over non-Muslim and heterodox populations, especially in the Balkans. For this support they were rewarded with lavish patronage.[74]

71. On this, see Cemal Kafadar, "Self and Others: The Diary of a Dervish in Seventeenth-Century Istanbul and First-Person Narratives in Ottoman Literature," *Studia Islamica* 69 (1989): 140.

72. See H. J. Kissling, "Aus der Geschichte des Chalvetijje-Ordens," *Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 103 (1953): 244–45, 250–51, 256–57; B. G. Martin, "A Short History of the Khalwatī Order of Dervishes," in *Scholars, Saints, and Sufis: Muslim Religious Institutions since 1500*, ed. Nikki R. Keddie (Berkeley, Calif., 1972), 281–82.

73. E. Behnam Şapolyo, *Mezhepler ve Tarikatlar Tarihi* (Istanbul, 1964), 448–49.

74. Nathalie Clayer, *Mystiques, état et société: Les Halvetis dans l'aire balkanique de la fin du XVe siècle à nos jours* (Leiden, 1994), ch. 2, esp. 106–112.

Along with drawing royal and elite favor and boasting well-endowed *tekkes* in and outside the capital, the Halvetis exhibited other strengths. They were comfortable operating in a wide variety of environments and were open, too, to the kind of mass initiation and recruitment campaigns that Nakşbendis generally shunned (though not in Kurdistan). To Nakşbendis, they represented formidable competitors in terms of winning new followers. This was the case both in those urban environments where the Nakşbendis themselves found the bulk of their following, and even more so in other settings—such as among the rural and heterodox populations of Anatolia and the Balkans, or among the Janissaries or local Arabic-speaking population in Egypt.[75] Given all this, Bosnevi might well harbor not only the frustration that—as Zilfi has shown—fellow imperial mosque preachers felt over the success of Halveti sheikhs in landing lucrative preacher positions. He might harbor also a particular Nakşbendi frustration over the success of Halveti sheikhs not as preachers, but as Sufi leaders.

It probably helped too that there was a tradition of contrasting Halvetis and Nakşbendis as epitomizing two types of Sufi devotional regimens. More than once the two *tarikat*s were taken to represent these two types, with their respective styles of vocal versus silent *zikr*. During the period of the Kadızadeli affair, at least three Ottoman commentators employed this specific classification and comparison—Evliya Çelebi, the historian Nev'izade Ata'i, and the bureaucrat and author Sarı Abdullah Efendi.[76]

All this is not to suggest that there was a fundamental rift between Nakşbendis and Halvetis or among Ottoman brotherhoods more generally. Nor were Halvetis and their devotional ritual all that dangerous to, or potentially disruptive of, the *şeri'at*-based order. By the seventeenth century, they had become distanced from their mixed beginnings in the Caucasus and Azerbaijan (where they had been associated with 'Ali worship and other elements of popular Islam). They had been for quite some time very much part of the same Sufi camp with Nakşbendis and other established urban Sufis (such as the Mevlevis), and were far removed from marginalized dervish

75. Clayer, *passim*; Mehmed Fuad Köprülü, *Islam in Anatolia after the Turkish Invasion (prolegomena)*, trans. and ed. Gary Leiser (Salt Lake City, Utah, 1993), 48. On Halveti sheikhs working among peasants or recruiting whole communities, see Muhibbi, 1:389, 3:277, 4:313. On their establishment in Egypt, see Martin, *Short History*, 290–97 and Michael Winter, *Society and Religion in Early Ottoman Egypt: Studies in the Writings of 'Abd al-Wahhab al-Sha'rani* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1982), 105–12.

76. Evliya Çelebi, 1:389; Nev'izade Ata'i, 60; Sarı Abdullah Efendi [Abdi], *Cevheret el-bidaye ve dürret en-nihaye*, MS Staatsbibliothek (Berlin), or. oct. 2667, 142b–148a.

groups in the Kalenderi (Per. *Qalandari*) tradition.[77] True, in his *Mizan ül-hakk*, Katib Çelebi had harsh things to say about Halvetis. He claimed that "hypocrisy" made them turn their dance and music rituals into "bait for the trap of imposture" and that for this reason "the brutish common people flock to them, and votive offerings and pious gifts pour into their lodges."[78] Still, to Bosnevi the main danger of the Halvetis was probably not so much that they were very different from the Nakşbendis, but rather that they were increasingly less so at a time of harsh anti-Sufi rhetoric.

There is nothing particularly surprising in this. Whether the goal is to reinforce self-identity, prove orthodoxy, or fight off potential criticism against one's own group, boundaries are commonly drawn vis-à-vis a kindred group or tradition, not a completely alien one. Bosnevi was keen to distance himself from such a kindred group. Conversely, when in the first half of the sixteenth century the Kızılbaş followers of Iran's Safavids were finding receptive audiences throughout Anatolia, it turns out that Nakşbendis did little to come to the state's rescue by trying to restrain or co-opt these elements. And they were probably poorly equipped for such task in the first place, given their elitism and their insistence on devotional sobriety, Sunni propriety, and *şeri'at*-mindedness. If any Ottoman Sufis were up to the task, it would have been rather those who were sufficiently connected to the apparatus of the state and resigned to its brand of Sunni Islam yet at the same time in some way congenial to the heterodox Kızılbaş, such as the Bektaşis, or perhaps the Halvetis.[79]

Conclusion

The involvement of Osman Bosnevi with the leadership of the Kadızadeli movement was nothing but striking. Here was a prominent Sufi sheikh and *tekke* incumbent doubling as an imperial mosque preacher and, moreover, as one of the spokesmen of a militantly puritanical, orthodox and anti-Sufi movement as harsh as any in the history of opposition to Sufism. The environment, to boot, was one in which Sufis were far from a mistrusted or misunderstood marginal group. They had long been an integral part of the Ottoman social and cultural life and urban fabric. They had access to the court and governing elite. The most respected ulema associated with Sufi

77. For the early Caucasus and Azerbaijan period, see Köprülü, 48. For the transformation of this *tarikat* as it moved west, see Martin, 275–86.

78. Katib Çelebi, *Mizan ül-hakk*, 26–27 (quotation from Gibb's translation, *Balance of Truth*, 43–44).

79. See the discussion in Le Gall, 140–50.

sheikhs, frequented their lodges, and attended their sermons and their sessions of poetry reading.

Granted, there was an old tradition of criticism of Sufism from within, whereby outright insiders in various locales and times denounced some fellow Sufis and their mystical ideas or devotional practice. Underlying social or political circumstances—and they were always the trigger—varied. The background could be competition over followers or material patronage along with a bid to prove the superiority of one's own group. In other cases the goal was to stave off outside censure or to rein in Sufis whose behavior provoked it—one could argue that this was part of a continuous process of defining and redefining boundaries that ultimately helped shape and shore up Sufism as an enduring intellectual tradition and social force. Some of Sufism's critics from within resorted to harsh language resembling that of the most strident outside opponents. But even among such harsh critics, Bosnevi's stance stands out, given the unusual militancy and activism of the movement for which he became a spokesman.

Pertinent as it must have been, the sheikh's Nakşbendi affiliation does not, by itself, provide the clue for his militant stance. Scholars have sometimes "demysticized" this *tarikat* in the sense of playing down its mystical dimensions and casting it primarily as a politicized Sufi-orthodox movement devoted to the protection of the *şeri'at*-based order. But evidence about the Ottoman Nakşbendiye of Bosnevi's time (i.e., the pre-Müceddidi period) does not bear out this characterization and it does not suggest that in itself the sheikh's Nakşbendi formation would have nurtured in him a predilection for imposing a strict orthodoxy on the public—let alone with such vehemence. Indeed, we have seen Nakşbendis of his day exhibiting a broad range of responses to the Kadızadeli challenge.

In Bosnevi's case we detect in addition a sense of urgency and a keen realization that it was critical to define clear boundaries within the Ottoman Sufi camp at a time when the Kadızadeli frenzy was making Sufism as a whole—even the very sober Sufism of the Nakşbendiye—susceptible to harsh criticism. It probably helped that Nakşbendis were used to defining their identity in opposition to fellow Sufis and their "inferior" practices, or that Halvetis were at the center of the Kadızadeli rhetoric. Halvetis had been for two centuries formidable competitors of the Nakşbendis in terms of recruiting followers and currying patronage; and they were often contrasted with Nakşbendis in a paradigm that presented the two *tarikat*s as epitomizing two types of Sufi piety—one emphatically sober, the other much less so. All the same, Halvetis had been for quite some time part of the same camp of established urban *tarikat*s to which the Nakşbendis themselves belonged. At a time of anti-Sufi frenzy such that the Kadızadelis set in motion, precisely

this could have made sharpening boundaries betweeen Nakşbendis and Halvetis even more necessary in Bosnevi's eyes.

The very fact that a Sufi sheikh could now double as a mosque preacher, and especially as an imperial mosque preacher, is also critical in making sense of Bosnevi's behavior. As Madeline Zilfi has shown, much of the resentment underlying the Kadızadeli campaign was generated by the frequent favoring of Sufi and particularly Halveti sheikhs of this time in appointments to lucrative preacher positions. In turn, the public exposure that a position as an imperial mosque preacher provided could be double edged. It would offer a sheikh of Bosnevi's kind unprecedented access to the general public and, hence, to potential Sufi recruits. But just as well, it would also put him under the unprecedented scrutiny of the state and would pressure him to take clear public stands on the most controversial issues of the day.

Finally, the stories of Bosnevi and that of his fellow Sufi and Kadızadeli Çelebi Şeyh have something to tell us not only about criticism of Sufism from within but also about the Kadızadeli movement. We are reminded that Sufi sheikhs and Kadızadeli leaders could come from similar social and educational backgrounds; the latter could well have roots in the Sufi tradition and family connections in the Sufi camp, and might even include among their ranks someone who was himself an active Sufi sheikh and *tekke* incumbent. This dimension of the Kadizadelis is not a negligible one. Neither focusing on their anti-Sufi rhetoric to the exclusion of all else, nor assuming a neat and fixed dichotomy of puritanical preachers and their popular following versus Sufi sheikhs and practitioners should allow this dimension to be obscured.